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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Case No. 14924

HERBERT L. SMART, individually
and as Director of Finance of
the State of Utah, and DAVID
SMITH MONSON, individually and
as Auditor of the State of Utah,
Defendant-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for declaratory judgment,
declaring the constitutionality of a state statute, the
Utah Housing Finance Agency Act, Utah Code Annotated
§63-44a-l, et seq, (Supp. 1975) (hereinafter the "Act"),
and for mandamus ordering the defendant state officials
to honor the Utah Housing Finance Agency's (hereinafter
the "Agency") request for funds appropriated to it under
the Act.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was argued to the Court upon cross
motions for summary judgment, supported by affidavits and
memoranda*

The Court determined that the Act was in all

respects constitutional, and issued the requested writ of
mandamus.

Subsequently, the writ was stayed pending the

prosecution of this appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellee seeks affirmance of the judgment below as to each and every issue presented to the
trial court, the lifting of the stay imposed pending the
appeal, and enforcement of the writ.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in defendantappellants1 brief is adequate.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY ACT SERVES A
PUBLIC PURPOSE.
Defendant-appellants claim (Point IB, Appellants1
Brief) that the Act and appropriations thereunder, are

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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unconstitutional because the Act does not serve a public
purpose.

It is not questioned that public funds may not

be spent for other than public purposes. However, the
question whether such legislation as the Utah Housing
Finance Agency Act serves a public purpose has been litigated in numberous sister states, and on this ground the
constitutionality of the legislation invariably has been
sustained.

California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott,

131 Cal. Rptr. 361 (Calif. 1976); Rich v. State of Georgia,
et al., 227 S.E.2d 761 (Ga. 1976); In Re Constitutionality
of ORS 456.720, 537 P.2d 542 (Ore. 1975); State ex rel
Warren

v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1974);

West v. Tennessee Housing Development Agency, 512 S.W.2d
275 (Tenn. 1974); State ex rel West Virginia Housing
Development Fund v. Waterhouse, 212 S.E.2d 727 (W. Va.
1974); Opinion to the Governor, 112 R.I. 151, 308 A.2d
809 (1973) ; Johnson v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency,
453 Pa. 329, 309 A.2d 528 (1973); Minnesota Housing Finance
Agency v. Hatfield, 297 Minn. 151, 210 N.W.2d 298 (1973);
Maine State Housing Authority v. Depositors Trust Co., 278
A.2d 699 (Maine 1971); Martin v. North Carolina Housing Corp.,
277 N.C.29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970); New Jersey Mortgage Finance
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Agency v. McCrane, 56 N.Jo 414, 267 A.2d 24 (1970);
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency v. New England
Merchants Natfl Bank, 356 Mass. 202, 249 N.E.2d 599 (1969);
Walker v. Alaska State Mortgage Association, 416 P.2d 245
(Alaska 1966).

Vermont Home Mortgage Credit Agency v.

Montpelier National Bank, 262 A.2d 445 (Vt. 1970).
The Act contains a declaration of public purpose
in Section 63-44a-2. In that section, the legislature
declares it the policy of the State to assist the provision of decent, safe, sanitary housing for the citizenry
where private institutions fail to do so*

There is then

contained a finding that such a failure has occurred in
that a lack of available financing has caused a decrease
in housing starts and in the transferability of existing
housing, with a resulting serious shortage of decent housing
for persons of low and moderate income*

Such a shortage,

the legislature finds, leads to unemployment in the housing
industry and to the creation of blight and slums.

The

legislature therefore specifically declares it a public
purpose for the State to cooperate with private institutions
to increase the amount of reasonably available financing for
the construction, purchase, and rehabilitation of decent,
low and moderate income housing.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Such legislative findings are entitled to great
respect, and may be disregarded only to the extent that
they are incorrect or unreasonable on their face. E.g.,
Allen v. Tooele County, 21 U.2d 383, 445 P.2d 994 (1968);
Thomas v. Daughters of the Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108,
197 P.2d 477 (1948); Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237,
48 P.2d 530 (1935).
In the Court below, plaintiff submitted the
affidavits of officers of four major Utah lending institutions and of an official of the Department of Community
Affairs of the State of Utah, attesting the kind of facts
upon which the Legislature based its findings. No counter
affidavits were submitted, and no question was raised by
defendants as to the truth or validity of the affidavits
submitted by plaintiff.

Where the problem described by

the legislature so plainly exists, the concern of the courts
is merely whether the problem falls within an area of
legitimate legislative concern, and whether the method
adopted by the legislature for dealing with the problem
is reasonably calculated to have the desired effect.
Thomas v. Daughters of the

tah Pioneers, supra; Lehi City

v. Meiling, supra; West v. Tennessee Housing Development
Agency, supra.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The matter of a serious shortage of safe,
sanitary, decent housing for a large segment of the
citizenry falls squarely within the police power of the
legislature to deal with the health, safety, and morals
of the populace.

E.g., Rich v. State of Georgia, supra;

State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, supra; Maine State Housing
Authority v. Depositors Trust Co., supra; Martin v. North
Carolina Housing Corp., supra; Walker v. Alaska State
Mortgage Association, supra.

Courts which have discussed

the matter indicate numerous ways in which making decent
housing more readily available beneficially effects the
health, safety and morals of the public.
Making it possible for a greater number of low
and middle income persons to purchase homes gives a greater
number a stake in society, and encouragement to be productive wage earners, and thus tends to stabilize society.
State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, supra; Martin v. North
Carolina Housing Corp., supra.
Increasing the transferability of low and middle
income housing by increasing financing therefor, and
increasing the availability of funds for home improvements
on such housing, tends to prevent the creation of blight and
slums and the consequent unsafe, overcrowded and unsanitary
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

conditions which breed crime and disease.

State ex rel

Warren v. Nusbaum, supra; MaineState Housing Authority
v. Depositors Trust Co«, supra; Martin v. North Carolina
Housing Corp., supra.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the
redevelopment of blighted and slum areas is a public purpose for which public funds may be spent.

Tribe v. Salt

Lake City, Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975).
It cannot be said that the finding of the legislature that a public purpose is served by increasing the
availability of financing for construction, purchase, and
rehabilitation of low and moderate income housing, is
incorrect or unreasonable on its face. Regarding defendants'
objection that the Act does not serve a public purpose, then,
it reamins only to be seen whether the method chosen by the
legislature to remedy the problem defined is reasonably
calculated to have the desired effect.
The general scheme chosen by the legislature, discussed in detail in the Facts section of Appellants1 brief,
is a common one.

Stated briefly, the Agency is authorized

to obtain tax free funds by the issuance of bonds and notes,
which it uses to provide low interest financing for low and
moderate income housing.

Debt created by the sale of notes,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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bonds, and other obligations is payable only out of funds
of the Agency, so that such obligations are self-liquidating.
At least one court has specifically addressed the problem
whether such a method is reasonably calculated to serve the
public purpose of increasing financing for low and moderate
income housing, holding that it is. West v. Tennessee
Housing Development Agency/ supra.

Generally the same

method was employed by the agencies involved in all of the
other sister state cases cited above, so that insofar as
each finds that a public purpose is served by the legislation there involved, each implicitly finds that raising low
interest funds for financing by sale of tax exempt selfliquidating bonds is an acceptably effective means of
accomplishing the public purpose.

The method is familiar

in Utah, where it has been approved for various public
purposes.

E.g., Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra

(city urban renewal bonds); Allen v. Tooele County, supra
(county bonds for industrial development); Conder v.
University of Utah, 123 Utah 182, 257 P.2d 367 (1953)
(University bonds for dormitory construction); Spence v.
Utah State Agricultural College, 119 Utah 104, 225 P.2d
18 (1950) (State College bonds for construction).
The Housing Finance Agency Act serves a public
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

purpose in that it is intended, and reasonably designed,
to alleviate an actual and existing problem having a
significant effect upon the public health, safety, and
welfare.

POINT II.
ANY PRIVATE BENEFITS CONFERRED BY THE ACT ARE
MERELY INCIDENTAL TO ITS DOMINANT PUBLIC PURPOSE.
Appellants assert (Point IB, Appellants' Brief)
that the Act is constitutionally offensive because its
operation will confer certain private benefits.

There is

an obvious private benefit to persons who are able to
obtain housing financing through the Agency who would not
have been able to obtain it elsewhere.

There is a less

substantial benefit to mortgage lenders who participate
in the Agency1s mortgage transactions.

These benefits,

however, are merely incidental to the dominant purpose of
the Act to alleviate a serious statewide shortage of decent
low and moderate income housing, with its consequent ill
effects.

While it is improper to spend public funds for

private purposes, such private benefits incidental to a
dominant public purpose do not detract from the constitutionality of the legislation.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I n Tribe v, Salt Lake City Corporation, supra, it
was charged that urban renewal legislation was unconstitutional insofar as the proposed renewal projects would confer
benefits upon adjoining private landowners.

The Court held

that these private benefits were incidental to the public
purpose of clearing slums and blight, and thus not dispositive of the question of constitutionality.
was held constitutional.

The legislation

See also Thomas v. Daughters of

the Utah Pioneers, supra.
It is immaterial, of course, whether the incidental
private benefits conferred by the legislation are viewed as
particularly "personal"•

What could be more "personal" than

the education provided by public universities, the food and
clothing provided by public welfare subsidies, the medical
attention underwritten by public medicare programs, all
of which have been found constitutionally proper?
The private benefits which may result from the
operation of the Housing Finance Agency Act are not different in kind from those described in Tribe.

They are

equally incidental to the main public purpose of the Act,
and do not affect its constitutionality.

This question has

been discussed and decided in favor of similar legislation

-10-
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in many of the sister state cases previously cited.

See,

State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, supra; Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency v, New England Merchants Natyl Bank, supra;
Vermont Home Mortgage Credit Agency v> Montpelier National
Bank, supra; Opinion to the Governor, supra; New Jersey
Mortgage Finance Agency v, McCrane, supra; West v. Tennessee
Housing Development Agency, supra.

POINT III.
THE ACT INVOLVES A MATTER OF STATEWIDE CONCERN,
PROPERLY DELEGATED TO A STATE AGENCY.
Appellants claim (Point IV, Appellants1 Brief)
that the Act violates Article VI, §28 of the Utah Constitution, which prohibits delegation to a "special commission,
private corporation or association, any power to make,
supervise, or interfere with any municipal improvement,
money, property or effects . • . or to perform any municipal
functions.ff

See Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra.

The

question central to such a claim is whether the Agency, in
assisting in providing low and moderate income housing, is
performing an essentially municipal function rather than
dealing with a matter of statewide concern, properly delegated to a state agency.

It cannot be seriously contended

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that the Agency can make or supervise municipal improvements
or interfere with municipal money, property, or effects*
In Carter v, Beaver County Service Area No* 1,
16 U.2d 280, 399 P.2d 440 (1965), the Court struck down, as
violative of Article VI, §29 (now §28), legislation allowing
counties to create a "service area", an agency of the state,
to provide numerous extended services, including "without
limitation" the following:
* * •extended police protection; structural fire protection; culinary or irrigation water retail service; water conservation; local park, recreation or
parkway facilities and services; cemeteries;
public libraries; sewers, sewage and storm
water treatment and disposal; flood control;
garbage and refuse collection; streetlighting;
airports; planning and zoning; local
streets and roads; curb, gutter and
sidewalk construction and maintenance;
mosquito abatement; health department
services; hospital service . * .
The Court found that in the form enacted the County Service
Area Act would allow the creation of a state agency which
could perform peculiarly municipal functions. However, as
subsequently amended to avoid being overly inclusive, the
legislation was subsequently upheld under Section 29 (now
Section 28) of Article VI, in Branch v. Salt Lake County
Service Area No* 2, 23 U.2d 181, 460 P.2d 814 (1969)*

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

The purpose of Article VI, Section 28, is to
preserve the right of local self-government to the localities,
and to prevent the state from interfering in the internal
affairs of cities and towns.

Carter, supra; State Water

Pollution Control Bd. v. Salt Lake City, 6 U.2d 247, 311
P#2d 370 (1957).

In Water Pollution Control Bd. v. Salt

Lake City, the Court held that while the Board had a legitimate function of preventing pollution of the state1s waters
on a statewide basis, it could not prescribe the internal
operation of a pre-existing city sewage system.

In that

case, the Court defined "municipal functions11, for the
purposes of Section 28, as being any and all functions in
which a city or town may properly engage, whether proprietary
or governmental.
It seems clear at once that expanding the credit
market for home financing for low and moderate income persons is not a regular internal function of cities and towns.
The present case does not present the Carter situation in
which, due to overbreadth of the legislation, the agency
might usurp an ordinary city function such as construction
of sidewalks or streetlighting.

This is not the Water Pollu-

tion Control Board case, in which a state agency seeks to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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supervise an existing municipal improvement performing a
historically municipal service.

There appears no historic

precedent in Utah for municipalities engaging directly in
the housing credit market.

It does not appear how partici-

pation by a state agency in home financing has any tendency
to interfere with the right of local self government .
Tribe, supra, holds that urban renewal is a matter
of statewide concern within Article VI, §28. Certainly the
strongly related function of preventing shortages of decent,
safe, sanitary housing is equally a matter of statewide
concern.

State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, supra, the only

case appellee has found which considers the question under
a provision such as Section 28, specifically so holds.
The Housing Finance Agency Act does involve a
matter of statewide concern properly delegated to a state
agency.

It has no tendency to invade any right of any

municipality to govern its internal affairs*

It does

not violate Article VI, Section 28 of the State Constitution.
POINT IV*
THE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY CANNOT CREATE STATE
DEBT OR PLEDGE THE CREDIT OF THE STATE.

-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellants allege (Points I and II, Appellants1
Brief) that the sale of bonds and notes by the Housing
Finance Agency will result in the lending of state credit
in favor of the Agency in violation of Article VI, Section
29 of the State Constitution and the creation of state
debt in violation of Article XIV, Section 1 of the State
Constitution*
Debts and obligations of the Agency are payable
solely out of funds of the Agency, ordinarily comprising
proceeds from bonds and notes and payments on loans.
Section 63-44a-15 (1). The Act specifically provides that
debts of the Agency cannot become debts of the state, that
the credit of the state cannot be lent in favor of the
Agency, and that funds of the state cannot be obligated to
pay debts of the Agency.

Section 63~44a-15. All notes

and bonds of the Agency must bear a disclaimer to such
effect.

Id.

The Utah law is very plain that such self-

liquidating notes and bonds of state agencies are not debts
of the state and do not effect a lending of the state's
credit.

Spence v. Utah State Agricultural College, supra;

Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp,, supra; Allen v. Tooele County,
supra.
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Spence considered legislation authorizing the State
College to issue bonds to raise construction funds. The
legislation provided that the bond debt should be payable
only out of revenue of the buildings constructed, and not
out of tax revenue of the state, and that the bonds should
bear a legend to that effect.

The Court held that plain-

tiff's claim of creation of state debt was controlled by
the "special fund doctrine11: where bonds of a state agency
are payable only out of a special fund comprised of revenues
of a facility to be constructed with the bond proceeds,
there is no creation of state debt because tax monies are
not obligated.
supra.

See also Conder v. University of Utah,

In short, unless the legislation creates a binding

obligation upon state revenues raised by taxation, there
is no creation of state debt.
Tribe reaches the same conclusion with regard to
notes and bonds of a quasi-municipal corporation:

where

the legislation provides that the notes and bonds shall
be payable out of revenue of facilities to be constructed,
and shall not be city debt, and the bond resolution and
ordinance, and bond form, all prohibit the use of city
credit to pay the bonds, no city debt is created and there
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is no lending of city credit in violation of the applicable
constitutional provisions.

See also Allen v. Tooele County,

supra, regarding county obligations.
An agency which supports itself by the sale of
self-liquidating notes and bonds in no way obligates the
state to raise or spend tax revenues, and therefore creates
no state debt.
The Housing Finance Agency Act also provides,
however, that the Agency must maintain a capital reserve
fund sufficient to cover currently maturing obligations.
Section 63-44a-12. Should current income be insufficient
to meet this requirement, an additional appropriation
may be sought from the legislature to cover the deficit,
and the legislature may make such an appropriation.
Sections 63-44a-12, 66-44a-19.

In short, the legislature

may make future appropriations to defray the obligations
of the Agency.

It has been charged in a number of the

housing finance agency cases from sister states that such
provisions constitute a lending of state credit and the
creation of state debt because they indicate that recourse
may be had to state funds to pay agency obligations where
agency funds are insufficient.

It does not appear that such
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provisions have been considered in a Utah case.
The courts which have considered the question
uniformly base their decisions on a distinction whether
the legislation obligates the state to make future appropriations to pay agency debt, or merely permits it to do
so.

If the legislation requires the legislature to make

future appropriations to defray agency obligation, the
legislation may be invalid as lending state credit and
creating state debt.

See In Re Constitutionality of ORS

456.720, supra, distinguishing Gibson v. Smith, 531 P.2d
724 (Ore. 1975); Casey v. South Carolina Housing Authority
264 So. C. 303, 215 S.E.2d .184 (1975).

(But see Massa-

chusetts Housing Finance Agency v. New England Merchants
Natyl Bank, supra, and Maine State Housing Authority v.
Depositors Trust Co., supra, holding that legislation mandatory in form is permissive in effect, insofar as one
legislature has no power to bind a future legislature to
appropriate.)

If, on the other hand, the legislation

merely permits the legislature to make such appropriations,
without requiring it to do so, it creates no binding obligation upon the state, and thus results in no lending of state
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credit or creation of state debt.

California Housing

Finance Agency v. Elliott, supra; State ex rel Warren
v. Nusbaum, supra; Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
v. New England Merchants Natyl Bank, supra; Maine State
Housing Authority v. Depositors Trust Co., supra; Opinion
to the Governor, supra; State ex rel West Virginia Housing
Development Fund v. Waterhouse, supra; Martin v. North
Carolina Housing Corp., supra; Minnesota Housing Finance
Agency v. Hatfield, supra; Walker v. Alaska State Mortgage
Assoc., supra; In Re Constitutionality of ORS 456,720,
537 P.2d 542 (Ore. 1975).
The Utah statute is of the latter type. It
permits, but does not require the legislature to make
future appropriations to the Agency.

(Nor would it be

appropriate to imply any requirement in the Act despite
its language, since it also appears to be the Utah rule
that one legislature has no power to bind a future legislature.

See the discussion of the prohibition of irre-

pealable laws in Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers,
supra, 197 P.2d at 497.)

That being so, the legislation

creates no binding obligation upon future tax revenues,
and thus cannot result in the lending of state credit or
the creation of state debt.
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Supposing that the capital reserve fund provisions of the Act are not unconstitutional insofar as
they create no binding obligation of the state to pay
future debts of the Agency, some question may still be
raised whether any actual future appropriation made by
the legislature in response to a felt "moral obligation11
would be constitutional.

It appears that they would be

entirely proper.
Certainly the fact that the Act may be interpreted as creating a flmoral obligation1,1 of the state to
pay future debts of the Agency does not make it unconstitutional as lending state credit or creating state
debt.

See Conder v. University of Utah, supra, 257 P.2d

at 370.

So long as the legislature, at the time an appro-

priation is sought, is not legally bound to appropriate
but may make an independent decision, no state debt or
commitment of state credit is involved.

Otherwise, the

question appears to be controlled by the rule that the
legislature may appropriate for any public purpose.

The

Agency, as discussed heretofore, serves a public purpose,
and any appropriation to the Agency for that purpose is
valid.

Retirement of Agency debt serves that purpose.

The specific question was presented in Maine State Housing
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Authority V, Depositors Trust Co., supra, Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency v. New England Merchants Nat 1 !
Bank, supra, and State ex rel West Virginia Housing
Development Fund v. Waterhouse, supra, under similar constitutional provisions, and in each case the court held
that such future appropriations would be valid.

See

278 A.2d at 709; 249 N.E.2d at 609-610; 212 S.E.2d at 731.
This Court should rule that any future appropriation of
the Utah legislature to the Utah Housing Finance Agency,
whether to retire bond debt or for any other end in
furtherance of the Agency1s public purpose, would be constitutionally proper.
Appellants base their claim that the Act will
affect a lending of the statefs credit in large part upon
the idea that "the appropriation of state funds constitutes
a flending of creditf.f!

This argument is said to be based

upon a "line of cases" represented by Button v. Day, 208
Va. 494, 158 S.E.2d 735 (1968).

In fact, the argument

appears to be nothing more than a misreading of the somewhat
confusing opinion in Button v. Day.

Appellees are unable

to find any other case which takes such an extreme position.
In fact, Button v. Day itself does not take the
extreme position alleged by appellants.

If mere appropriation
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were an unconstitutional lending of credit, then, of
course, the legislature could never appropriate. What
was (properly) found offensive in Button v. Day is that
the legislation created a "guarantee fund11, of public
tax monies, to pay off private loans for the construction of privately owned industrial plants, where the
private borrowers defaulted.

The legislation contained

an initial appropriation for the guarantee fund. Obviously,
and as the Virginia Court found, this legislation bound
the state in future (when there was a default) as a guarantor of private debts.

In defense of the legislation it

was urged that it permitted only a single, present appropriation, for the public purpose of stimulating industrial
growth.

The Court found this distinction immaterial:

the

purpose was to guarantee private debts with public monies,
and that was unconstitutional whether the money was appropriated now or in future when the loans went bad.

The

Court merely held that the none shot11 appropriation was
not a defense in that case, not that present appropriation
in and of itself violates the lending of state credit prohibition found in most state constitutions.
Button v» Day has no bearing upon the present
case, because the present Act provides for no guarantee
-22-
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fund.

None of the public funds appropriated under this

Act, or which can be appropriated under this Act, can be
applied on any private debt under any circumstances.
POINT V.
PROPERTY OF THE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY IS
PROPERLY EXEMPT FROM TAXATION.
Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution
provides generally that all tangible property in the state
not constitutionally exempt, shall be taxed in proportion
to its value.

Section 3 of Article XIII requires the

legislature to enact uniform rates of assessment and taxation on such property.

Section 10 of Article XIII subjects

corporations and persons presently doing business in the
state to taxation on their property owned or held locally*
Appellants claim (Point III B, Appellant's Brief) that the
Housing Finance Agency Act violates these provisions of the
State Constitution insofar as it provides, in Section
63-44a-16, that all Agency property, and all notes and bonds
thereof, together with interest payable thereon and income
derived therefrom, shall be exempt from all forms of taxation.
The answer to this contention, however, is found
in Article XIII, Section 2 itself, which also provides that
"The property of the state . . . shall be exempt from
f!
taxation.
held
by Law
anSchool,
agency
of the state
DigitizedProperty
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for a public purpose is state property exempt from taxation.
In short, this contention is answered by the prior discussion
of the public purpose of the Act:

since the public purpose

of the Act is clear, Agency property used for such purpose
is exempt.

See Allen v. Tooele County, supra, holding that

county industrial development bonds, proceeds therefrom and
payments thereon, are properly tax exempt as public property
serving a public purpose.

Such tax exemption has frequently

been alleged in opposition to similar housing finance agency
acts, but the statutes have been upheld by every court which
has ruled on the matter*

Rich v. State of Georgia, supra;

State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, supra; West v. Tennessee
Housing Development Agency, supra; Johnson v. Pennsylvania
Housing Finance Agency, supra; Martin v. North Carolina
Housing Corp., supra; Minnesota Housing Finance Agency
v. Hatfield, supra.
POINT VI.
THE ACT DOES NOT INVOLVE AN IMPROPER DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.
No doubt, and as appellee has argued earlier
herein, the matters with which the Housing Finance Agency
Act deals are matters of statewide concern, as to which
only the legislature has power to make laws under Article
V, Section 1 and Article VI, Section 1 of the State ConDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

stitution.

Appellants allege (Point V, Appellant's

Brief) that the Act is an improper attempt by the legislature to delegate its law making authority as to such
matters to the Agency.
The legislature may not, of course, simply cede
to an agency its authority to make law on any subject.
See State v. Goss, 79 Utah 599, 11 P.2d 340 (1932); Clayton
v. Bennett, 5 U.2d 152, 298 P.2d 531 (1956).

On the other

hand, authority to make rules and regulations for the
carrying into effect of a policy prescribed by the legislature may be conferred upon an administrative agency.

In

such a case, the legislation will be upheld if the legislature has provided sufficient standards for procedure and
decision as to confine the potential action of the agency
within the bounds of the legislative policy.

State v.

Goss, supra; Clayton v. Bennett, supra; Western Leather &
Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 87 Utah 277, 48 P.2d
526 (1935).
The Housing Finance Agency Act accords the Agency
power to make rules and regulations for the implementation
of the Act.

The Act, however, also contains comprehensive

standards confining Agency power to implementing a clearly
and completely defined legislative purpose.

The authority
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granted the Agency to make rules and regulations —

found

in Section 63-44a-9(a), 63-44a-5(3), and 63-44a-10 -- is
authority to regulate the conduct of the business of
housing finance specifically prescribed to the Agency by
the legislature and to control and dispose of the property
of the Agency.

The power and duties of the Agency are set

out in comprehensive detail in Sections 63-44a-4, 5, 9, 10
and 11. No authority is conferred upon the Agency to
regulate the property or conduct of third persons, as is
ordinarily complained of in cases arising under these provisions of the Utah Constitution.

E.g., State v. Goss,

supra; Clayton v. Bennett, supra; Western Leather & Finding
Co. v. State Tax Commission, supra.
The authority of the Agency to internally regulate
the disposition of its own business and property, as clearly
defined by the legislature, does not involve any power to
make law as to any subject.

The detailed specification by

the legislature of the business in which the agency may
engage and the property it may hold provide ample standards
of conduct and decision to avoid a bare delegation of legislative power.
Section 63«44a-3(6) does permit the Agency to
determine who are "low and moderate income persons" entitled
-26-
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to the benefits of the Act.

The decision, however, is to

be made based upon specific criteria set forth.

The legis-

lature may commit to administrative agencies factual decisions as to the applicability of legislation, so long as
the standards for decision are spelled out.

Clayton v.

Bennett, supra.
The objection that housing finance agency legislation such as Utah!s involves an improper delegation of
legislative power was made and disposed of in favor of the
legislation in Rich v. State of Georgia, supra; State ex
rel Warren v. Nusbaum, supra; Vermont Home Mortgage Credit
Agency v. Montpelier Nat'l Bank, supra; Johnson v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, supra; Opinion to the Governor,
supra; State ex rel West Virginia Housing Development
Fund v. Waterhouse, supra; Martin v. North Carolina Housing
Corp., supra; New Jersey Mortgage Finance Agency v. McCrane,
supra; West v. Tennessee Housing Development Agency, supra.
POINT VII.
THE ACT DOES NOT CREATE A CORPORATION BY
SPECIAL ACT.
Article XII, Section 1, of the Utah Constitution
provides that corporations may be created under general
law, but may not be created by special law.

Appellants
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allege (Point III A, Appellant's Brief) that the Housing
Finance Agency Act violates this section because it creates
an agency in corporate form by special act.
In fact, the Agency is a "body corporate and
politic11 of the State.

It is not an ordinary corporation

in the sense of the constitutional prohibition.

While

there appear to be no cases in point under Article XIII,
Section 1, there are dispositive rulings under the related
provision of Article XI, Section 5, which forbids the
legislature to create "corporations for municipal purposes11
by general law.
In Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 119 Utah 214, 226
P.2d 127 (1950), it was claimed that creation of an improvement district by a county pursuant to statute violated
Article XI, Section 5.

The Court questioned whether the

improvement district in fact performed municipal functions
and whether the legislation in question was a "special
law.11

In any case, the Court said, the improvement district

was not a corporation under the constitutional provision.
Since the improvement district operated separately and
independently of any municipal authority, and had no control
over municipal property or functions, it was to be considered
a separate arm of the state government performing a public
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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purpose.

As such, it was not within the constitutional

prohibition.

The same result was reached in Freeman v.

Stewart, 2 U.2d 319, 273 P.2d 174 (1954).
As discussed earlier herein, the Housing Finance
Agency has been created to perform a statewide function
and a public purpose.

It is an independent arm of the

state government, not a corporation.

It is, therefore,

not within the prohibition of Article XIII, Section 1.
POINT VIII.
THE ACT DOES NOT CREATE A CORPORATION FOR
MUNICIPAL PURPOSES BY SPECIAL ACT.
The foregoing discussion is also dispositive
of appellants1 contention that the Housing Finance Agency
Act creates a municipal corporation by special act.
POINT IX.
THE ACT IS A GENERAL, NOT A SPECIAL, LAW.
No special law may be enacted where a general
law would be applicable.
Constitution.

Article VI, Section 26, State

Appellants claim (Point IV, Appellantfs

Brief) that the Housing Finance Agency Act is a special
law.

The Housing Finance Agency Act is a general law

within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
The leading Utah case on the subject appears to
be

State Digitized
v. Kallas,
97 Utah 492, 94 P12d 414 (1939)
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concerning the Liquor Control Act of 1935. As against the
contention that the act in question was a "special law",
the Court set forth the following definitions:
Laws which apply to and operate
uniformly upon all members of any class
of persons, places, or things requiring
legislation peculiar to themselves in
the matters covered by the laws in question, are general and not special . . .
Special legislation is such as relates
either to particular persons, places,
or things, or to persons, places, or
things which, though not particularized,
are separated by any method of selection
from the whole class to which the law
might, but for such legislation, be
applied, while a local law is one
whose operation is confined within
territorial limits, other than those
of the whole state or any properly
constituted class or locality therein.
94 P.2d 414 at 420.

See also Tygesen v. Magna Water Co.>

supra.
Under these definitions, it is immaterial that in
a given instance a law may apply to a narrow group or locale.
The law is a special and not a general law only if by its
terms, it must apply only to a particular limited class or
locale.
The Housing Finance Agency Act applies uniformly
to all low and moderate income persons.

It contains a

specific finding of the legislature that the legislation is
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required for this particular class. It contains no special
or local limitations confining its operation to particular
persons, places, or things.

It applies likewise to all

persons and all parts of the state.

It is clearly a general

rather than a special law.
POINT X.
THE ACT CREATES NO IRREVOCABLE FRANCHISE,
PRIVILEGE, OR IMMUNITY.
The Housing Finance Agency Act provides in Section
63-44a~14 that the State shall not interfere with the rights
granted the Agency to fulfill its contracts with bond
holders, or impair the right of bond holders thereunder,
until the obligations are discharged.

It has occasionally

been argued as to such legislation, as appellants assert
here

(Point VI, Appellant's Brief), that such a pledge of

the State confers an "irrevocable franchise, privilege, or
immunity11 upon bond holders in violation of such a provision
as Article I, Section 23 of the Utah Constitution. See,
Johnson v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, supra.
In fact, the benefit conferred by this provision
is neither irrevocable, nor a "franchise, privilege, or
immunity.11

The benefit, by its terms, terminates when the

Agency1s obligation is discharged.
irrevocable.

It is, therefore, not

The provision in fact, merely implements
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Article I, §18 of the Utah Constitution and Article I,
Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution
prohibiting the State from enacting any law impairing the
obligation of contracts.

The result under the Housing

Finance Agency Act would be precisely the same if it did
not contain Section 63-44a~14, because of the State and
federal constitutional provisions to the same effect.

The

benefit conferred by Section 63-44a-14, therefore, cannot
be a "franchise, privilege, or immunity11 in violation of
Article I, §23 of the State Constitution.
POINT XI.
THE ACT DOES NOT PERMIT IMPOSITION OF TAXES
FOR THE PURPOSES OF ANY COUNTY, CITY, OR TOWN.
Finally, Appellants contend (Point IV, Appellantfs
Brief) that the Housing Finance Agency Act permits the
legislature to impose taxes for the purposes of a county,
city, town, or other municipal corporation in violation
of Article XIII, Section 5, of the State Constitution.
Clearly the Act permits (rather than requires)
the legislature to appropriate tax monies to the purposes of
the Agency.

To the extent, however, as discussed earlier,

that such purposes are statewide, public purposes, it is
clear that the Act does not permit taxation for county, city,
town, or municipal purposes in violation of the State
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Constitution.
POINT XII.
DEFENDANTS HAVE A DUTY TO PROCESS PLAINTIFFfS
REQUEST FOR FUNDS.
The Housing Finance Agency Act is constitutional
in all respects.

The appellants have each a statutory duty,

which may be compelled by mandamus, to process the Agency1s
request for funds, and, if the same is in proper form and
within the appropriation, to issue a warrant upon the
Treasury for the funds.
The duty of the Director of Finance is defined
by Section 63-38-11, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1969), which
provides:
The director of finance shall exercise
budgetary control over all state departments,
institutions and agencies . . . The director
shall examine and approve or disapprove all
requisitions and requests for proposed expenditures of the several departments . . . and
no requisitions of any of the departments
shall be allowed nor shall any obligation be
created without the approval and the certification of the director*
Under the same section, the Director shall approve the
disbursal of funds upon request if the request is within the
budget of the agency and current appropriations therefor.
See also Section 63-38-10.
The duty of the State Auditor in this regard
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Director of Finance, since it derives from Article VII,
§17 of the Utah Constitution, which provides the "The
Auditor shall be Auditor of Public Accounts . . . and ..
• . . shall perform such other duties as may be provided
by law.11

In Preece v, Ramp ton, 27 U.2d 56, 492 P.2d

1355 (1972), it was held that the latter part of this
provision includes the duty to approve or disapprove
warrants upon the Treasury, which duty the Auditor had
performed as of the date of adoption of the State Constitution.
No funds may be obtained from the State Treasury
except upon presentation of a warrant therefor to the
Treasurer.

See Section 67-4-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953).

By Section 67-4-4, enacted in 1963, it was attempted to
consolidate the function of issuing warrants upon the
Treasury with the budgetary functions of the Department of
Finance*

The section was held unconstitutional in Preece

v. Rampton, supra, which held that while the Auditor could
not be divested of his constitutional function of approving
or disapproving warrants, the clerical function of drafting
warrants for approval could be conferred upon the Department
of Finance.

The modern practice under the foregoing author-

ities is that requests for funds are directed to the Departby the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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with the budgets and appropriations, and, if the request
is approved, a warrant is drafted and conveyed to the
Auditor for approval.

If the Auditor concurs that the

request is within budgets and appropriations, the warrant
may be presented to the Treasurer.

No valid warrant may

be obtained without the approval of both the Director of
Finance and the Auditor.

In short, what had been the

historic function of the Auditor —

to examine and approve

requests for funds and issue warrants therefor -- is in
modern practice shared by the Auditor and the Director of
Finance.
When the function was performed by the Auditor
alone, it was held that mandamus would lie to compel performance of the function.
(1878-1879).

Nelson v. Clayton, 2 Utah 299

In that case, the Auditor refused to audit

the accounts of the warden of the penitentiary or to issue
a warrant on the Treasury for the sum shown by such accounts,
though there was a current appropriation to defray the
wardenfs costs of operating the penitentiary.

The Court

found that the duty to audit the account, and, if the
account were found correct, to issue the warrant, was
statutorily required, and issued the writ of mandamus to
the Auditor accordingly.
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No claim has been raised in this matter that
the Agency's request for funds is outside its budget or
appropriation.

The Agency has sought only the specific

amounts appropriated to it by the legislature. Appellants'
response is merely that the Agency is not constitutionally
created.

Appellants are incorrect in the latter regard:

they have each a statutorily imposed, ministerial duty to
review and approve the Agency's request for funds and issue
a warrant therefor on the Treasury.

CONCLUSION
The Utah Housing Finance Agency Act is in all
respects constitutional.

Particularly, it is constitu-

tional under each and every provision of the Utah Constitution asserted by appellants . The Court should affirm the
judgment below so declaring.
Appellants have each a statutory, non-discretionary,
ministerial duty to review the Housing Finance Agency1s request for funds appropriated to the Agency, and if the
request is proper and within the appropriation, to approve
the same and issue a warrant upon the State Treasury for
the funds. Appellants do not claim that the request is
improper or not within the appropriation.
that the Act is unconstitutional.

They merely assert

The request is proper
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and within the appropriation.
tutional.

The Act is consti-

The Court should sustain the issuance to the

defendants of a writ of mandamus ordering them forthwith
to review and approve the Agency's request for funds, and
to issue a warrant for such funds upon the State Treasury.
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Gerald R. Miller
E. Craig Smay
Kenneth W. Yeates

By C . ( X. ^... p(
^'-^
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
141 East FiiySt South /
Salt Lake City, Utah /84111
Telephone: 532-3333

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing
Brief of Respondent, was mailed, postage prepaid, this
4th day of February, 1977, to Robert B. Hansen, Attorney
General and William T. Evans, Assistant Attorney General,
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants*

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
^<fe,^
( ,.(
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
errors.

}o'(/?A

